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California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 32) requires the state to reduce 
aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. One of the challenges California faces is how 
the state should regulate the electricity sector. About 80 percent of the state’s electricity consumption is 
generated in the state, but about 52 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity 
consumption comes from outside the state. The question addressed in this paper is where to locate the 
point of compliance in the electricity sector—that is, where in the supply chain linking fuel suppliers to 
generators to the transmission system to retail load-serving entities should the obligation for measurement 
and compliance be placed. The conclusion offered is that one particular approach to regulating the 
electricity sector—the “first-seller approach”—would be best for California. The alternative “load-based 
approach” has a running head start in the policy process but would undermine an economywide market-
based emissions trading program. 
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In 2006 California adopted the California Global Warming Solutions Act (Assembly Bill 
32), which requires the state to reduce aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020. The act charges the California Air Resources Board to develop a comprehensive plan for 
implementation by January 1, 2009; the plan will involve a number of state agencies. Whether 
the state will rely on prescriptive technological standards, incentive-based approaches such as 
cap-and-trade, or a combination is a decision that will be made in the next couple of years.  
One of the challenges California faces is how the state should regulate the electricity 
sector. Electricity consumption accounts for 23.5 percent of the greenhouse gases in the state, 
including about 27.7 percent of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This is low on a per capita 
basis compared with the rest of the country, where electricity consumption accounts for about 33 
percent of greenhouse gases and about 40 percent of CO2 emissions (which is about 9 percent of 
total CO2 emissions worldwide).1 The largest category of greenhouse gas emissions in California 
is transportation, which accounts for about 40.4 percent (California Market Advisory Committee 
2007). Nonetheless, the electricity sector remains very important to the design of the California 
trading program. First, the electricity sector is typically identified as the source of most potential 
greenhouse gas reductions in the near term. Modeling at a national level indicates that the 
electricity sector is responsible for about 40 percent of the nation’s CO2 emissions but will 
account for between two-thirds and three-quarters of emissions reductions in the next two 
decades under national policy (EIA 2007; Pizer et al. 2006). Second, experience with cap-and-
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1 The Market Advisory Committee (2007, 41) reports that the carbon intensity of electricity generation in California 
in 2004 was 700 pounds of CO2 per MWh. Accounting for imported power brings the average emissions intensity of 
electricity consumed in the state to 930 pounds per MWh. Across the nation, the average emission intensity of 
electricity generation is 1,176 pounds per MWh. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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trade has been largely in the electricity sector. Previous programs, including the sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) trading programs in the United States and the Emission Trading 
Scheme for CO2 in the European Union focus exclusively on point sources, largely made up of 
electricity generators. The electricity sector is the demonstrated successful testing ground for this 
type of regulation. 
 










































































































































































Source: California Market Advisory Committee, 2007 
Although California’s own generation resources are low emitting, its imported power is 
relatively high emitting. About 80 percent of the state’s electricity consumption is generated in 
the state, but as illustrated in Figure 1, about 52 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with electricity consumption comes from outside the state (CEC 2006). Attempts to 
regulate only in-state sources would be expensive per ton of emissions reduction compared with 
the opportunities to reduce emissions on a broader scale. Given the open transmission system, 
attempts to regulate only in-state sources also would lead to more imported power, with an 
associated increase in emissions out of state. The act anticipated this issue by requiring that the 
state’s greenhouse gas reduction target include the out-of-state emissions associated with 
California electricity consumption.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
3 
This paper addresses options for regulation of California’s electricity sector within the 
context of an economywide cap-and-trade program in the state, and potentially for the nation. 
The major decision addressed in this paper is where to locate the point of compliance in the 
electricity sector—that is, where in the supply chain linking fuel suppliers to generators to the 
transmission system to retail load-serving entities should the obligation for measurement and 
compliance be placed. Sections 2 sets out the different approaches that have been suggested and 
Section 3 addresses the debate about these approaches in detail. Section 4 provides a conclusion. 
The conclusion offered is that the “first-seller approach” to regulating the electricity 
sector would be best for California. The alternative, the “load-based approach,” has a running 
head start in the policy process and is more familiar to many advocates and policymakers. Most 
of the reasons cited to advance the load-based approach over the first-seller approach are in fact 
distinctions without a difference: the approaches would have the same effect. For example, the 
load-based approach would provide additional incentives for efficiency investments, but so 
would the first-seller approach. However, the approaches differ in some fundamental ways. The 
load-based approach would have greater complexity, and it would not provide transparent signals 
to electricity generators about the scarcity value of CO2 in the economy. A load-based approach 
would appear substantially different from existing markets for environmental goods, and indeed, 
it might be more accurately described not as a market but as increasingly flexible regulation.  
It is most important for policymakers to recognize that the future of electricity markets 
and allowance markets are intertwined. If the vision for the future of California’s electricity 
markets were regulation as currently practiced, then the load-based approach would not be 
inconsistent. But if the goal is to increase competition—for example, through the introduction of 
a day-ahead market as planned, for 2008—then the load-based approach to a cap-and-trade 
program would pose a fundamental conflict.  
Point of Compliance for CO2 Cap-and-Trade in California’s Electricity Sector 
One month after passage of the California Global Warming Solutions Act, Governor 
Schwarzenegger issued an executive order creating the Market Advisory Committee to advise 
the California Air Resources Board (CARB) on developing a plan for a cap-and-trade program. 
One alternative identified by the committee is an “upstream” approach that would regulate 
emissions at the point where fossil fuels enter the economy. Implementation at this point could Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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achieve coverage of 83 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions in the state by regulating 150 
facilities.2 Under this approach, the question of how to regulate the electricity sector would not 
be relevant because carbon emissions would be regulated before they entered the electricity fuel 
cycle.  
However, the approach that received the most attention, partly based on precedent in 
other trading programs, is “midstream” regulation. As illustrated by Figure 2, this approach 
would regulate midway in the fuel cycle between the introduction of fossil fuels into the 
economy and their end use. This approach could achieve comparable coverage of 83 percent of 
the state’s emissions by regulating 490 facilities, assuming that transportation fuels would be 
regulated at the refinery.  
 
















Crucial Architecture for CO2:
Distinguish the Point of Regulation (Compliance)
from the Point of Allocation
 
 
We focus on the question of how the midstream approach would be implemented in the 
electricity sector. Two approaches have been discussed most thoroughly. One, a load-based 
approach, would shift compliance responsibility downstream from the point of combustion and 
would place a legal obligation for reporting and compliance with the load-serving entities—the 
                                                 
2 This approach would require monitoring and reporting for all fossil fuels produced in or imported into California, 
as well as fuel exports. This includes about 100 business entities that take delivery of gas via a pipeline. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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firms that sell retail electricity directly to customers. Compliance implies that these entities 
would be responsible for surrendering an allowance for every ton of CO2 used by electricity 
generators upstream to provide electricity services to their customers. In a decision that preceded 
the statewide legislation, the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had already 
identified a load-based approach for regulating greenhouse gases in the electricity sector in 
California. PUC regulates the private investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that provide about 80 
percent of the state’s retail electricity. Under statewide legislation and implementing regulations 
to be developed by CARB, the remainder of the population served by municipal utilities and 
others would also participate. 
The alternative approach was proposed initially by the Market Advisory Committee 
(2007) and is known as a first-seller approach. It would place a legal obligation for reporting and 
compliance on the first seller of power into California electricity markets. The first seller is the 
owner, operator, or power marketer for a generation facility located in the state, or the party 
bringing power onto the electricity grid for power generated out of state. Compliance would be 
required for power placed into the transmission system from that facility. For in-state sources, a 
first-seller approach would look very similar to the source-based system that characterizes 
previous trading programs, such as the SO2 trading program, in which compliance is required at 
the point of combustion—that is, where emissions are released into the atmosphere. 
Both approaches are imperfect tools for dealing with imported power, as I discuss below. 
It is worth emphasizing that if California’s program is integrated into the efforts of the six states 
and two Canadian provinces participating in the Western Climate Initiative and a cap-and-trade 
program emerges in this broader geographic region, the issue of electricity imports will be much 
reduced. The other states participating in the initiative are Washington, Oregon, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Utah.  
The Western Electricity Coordinating Council coordinates power dispatch over the 
western electricity grid and encompasses portions of 14 western states (including the entirety of 
11 states) along with British Columbia and Alberta. The western grid operates largely in 
isolation from the rest of the nation. The Western Climate Initiative would bring the vast 
majority of power generated in the region into the trading program. It is also worth noting that 
the first-seller approach would naturally evolve into a source-based program, since a growing 
proportion of generation sources are located within the trading region, but the load-based 
approach would retain the point of regulation on load-serving entities (LSEs). Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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Another crucial issue in the design of the program is the method of initially distributing 
emissions allowances. As Figure 2 illustrates, there is no reason that the point of allocation and 
the point of compliance should be the same. In fact, a substantial literature has advocated for the 
use of an auction rather than free allocation for distributing allowances.3 This is the approach 
being used for 100 percent of the allowances being distributed by New York and 5 other states in 
the 10-state Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (the remaining states are still 
considering their plans).4 An auction approach also was the approach highlighted as preferable, 
especially after a transition period, by the Market Advisory Committee. 
Analysis of Point of Compliance 
Several issues have surfaced in deliberation about the point of compliance as advocates 
for one or another viewpoint have tried to distinguish the two approaches.5 I address these issues 
in three groups. The first group is where differences of opinion abound, although there is 
fundamentally little or no difference to be made in performance between a first-seller and a load-
based approach. The second group of issues does involve fundamental distinctions. The third 
comprises issues where the jury is still out, especially on the legality of these approaches. 
Where There Are Distinctions without Any Difference  
Proponents and opponents of each approach contend that the choice would affect the 
regulation of imported power, procurement policies, and efficiency policies and have effects on 
both producers and customers of electric power. The alleged differences in the performance of 
the load-based and first-seller approaches do not hold up under scrutiny, however.  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Parry (1997) and Goulder et al. (1999), who demonstrate that an auction with revenue recycling 
aimed at reduction of other taxes dramatically lowers the social cost of the policy. Burtraw et al. (2001) demonstrate 
that an auction also has the property of providing more efficient pricing regulated regions of the country. CIER 
(2007) demonstrates that an auction can provide revenues that reinforce program goals by funding investments in 
energy efficiency and thereby lower the cost of the program for consumers.  
4 The initiative’s memorandum of understanding specified that all states should allocate at least 25 percent of the 
emissions allowances created by a cap-and-trade program to consumer benefit and strategic energy initiatives. An 
auction of allowances is the most likely way to implement this policy. 
5 See, for example, the proceedings and supporting documents submitted at the Joint En Banc Hearing of PUC and 
CEC on Point of Regulation in the Electricity Sector in San Francisco on August 21, 2007. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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Regulating Imported Power 
California cannot regulate or impose financial regulatory burdens directly on out-of-state 
sources, but it can indirectly affect the use of out-of-state generation. This is the primary 
motivation for looking beyond a source-based approach to regulation, and it is the reason most 
often cited in favor of a load-based approach. However, the load-based approach is a very 
imperfect way to regulate out-of-state emissions, and the first-seller approach is no better. One 
problem for both approaches is the imprecise assignment of emissions to generation for at least 
some portion of imported power. Another difficulty is “contract shuffling,” which is the 
opportunity for wholesalers of out-of-state power to shift the assignment of existing sources with 
relatively low emissions rates to serve California while assigning higher-emitting sources to 
serve other load centers outside California. Bushnell (2007) argues that the opportunity may exist 
for 100 percent contract shuffling, meaning all of the imported power coming to California could 
be identified as zero emissions without any real change in the resource mix throughout the 
western electricity grid. 
There is reason to believe that the opportunities for contract shuffling may be limited. 
Both approaches would rely on the California Climate Action Registry’s Power/Utility Reporting 
Protocol, which assigns emissions intensity to imported power. According to a recent study by 
the California Energy Commission (Alvarado and Griffin 2007), this approach allows for a 
precise identification of the power plant and associated emissions for about 56 percent of 
imported power. The remainder would have to be assigned emissions intensity based on other 
information, such as the average emissions intensity for the control region from which the power 
is delivered into California. The transmission path for imported power cannot be tracked directly, 
but the financial path can be tracked based on the information in electronic North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) E-tag documents.6 Under either approach, this is the 
information that regulators would use to make an assignment of emissions out of state to the use 
of electricity in California. Under a load-based approach, information about the emissions 
intensity of imported power would be conveyed downstream to the LSE. Under a first-seller 
approach, this information would be the measure upon which to base the compliance 
                                                 
6 NERC E-tags are electronic documents used to track the transmission of electricity so that sources of grid 
congestion can be more easily identified and mitigated. In addition to identifying the parties with financial 
ownership of the power, the E-tag identifies the source and destination control region. Parties identified on the E-
tags are licensed to schedule power into the transmission grid. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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responsibility of the party listed on the E-tag document—that is, the party that is the first seller of 
imported power to the electricity grid.  
In sum, the basis for assessing the emissions intensity of imported power would be the 
same for both approaches, and the approaches are similar in their ability to account for imported 
power. The distinction between them stems from what happens on the California side of the 
boarder. The load-based approach would require an additional level of approximation in making 
an assignment between the contracting party identified as the first seller and the LSE that has the 
compliance obligation—something discussed in Section 3.2.  
Procurement Policies 
A second issue of little practical difference is how the choice of a point of compliance 
would affect PUC’s portfolio-planning activities. PUC plays an important role in ensuring that 
dispatch meets social goals through a variety of previous orders, including most generally the 
procurement standard, which specifies the order in which regulated utilities should develop 
resources to meet demand. The order gives priority to efficiency first and renewables second, 
before turning to fossil-fired generation. Advocates of a load-based approach argue that this 
approach is necessary to support PUC’s role. 
Would or should PUC’s supply-side procurement policies end if there is a greenhouse gas 
cap-and-trade program? From PUC’s perspective, the answer is obviously no. PUC’s policy 
development in this area predates events that have moved climate policy to center stage in 
California and reflects long-standing goals for reducing air pollution, promoting stability in the 
supply and price of energy resources, and promoting economic development in the state.  
Would it make a difference for those policies whether a load-based or a first-seller 
approach was adopted? One can be equally emphatic in answering this question, although the 
issue is more subtle. PUC’s initiative toward developing a greenhouse gas program follows on 
top of the other policies and is not intended to substitute for them. PUC initially declared its 
intent to develop a load-based cap on electricity sector emissions in February 2006, well before 
passage of the California Global Warming Solutions Act. The load-based approach was chosen 
not because it was the preferred design to complement the other goals but because it was the only 
option available to PUC for designing a cap on electricity sector emissions. PUC regulates 
investor-owned utilities, which account for roughly 80 percent of the delivered electricity supply 
in California. Furthermore, the generation fleet of the IOUs is predominantly nonemitting 
nuclear, geothermal, wind, and hydroelectric resources, and a large portion of the IOUs’ load is 
met with system power. PUC regulates only IOUs, and not the independent power producers and Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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others who sell power to the IOUs. A source-based emissions cap on the IOUs’ own generation 
would have little benefit because IOU generation is already so clean and because the majority of 
emissions used to serve the IOU load would remain unregulated. Therefore, PUC has limited 
options when it comes to regulating emissions within the state. 
In designing an emissions cap, PUC had only one option, to impose requirements on the 
load-serving function of the IOUs. This is the same regulatory handle that is exercised in other 
rules governing how the IOUs meet their resource requirements. For example, as mentioned 
above, PUC’s “loading order,” adopted in May 2003 as part of the state’s Energy Action Plan, 
establishes the priorities for energy procurement for IOUs. In December 2004, PUC adopted a 
CO2 cost adder of $8 to $25 per ton to be added into system dispatch, and in October 2005, it 
issued a policy statement on a greenhouse gas performance standard.7 These are all load-based 
approaches to regulation because that is the main way that PUC can affect IOU practice, and it 
can affect other sources only indirectly. Furthermore, all these requirements will remain in place 
whether a statewide cap-and-trade program targets the LSEs or the first sellers. 
Acting by itself as an independent agency, PUC did not realistically have the option of 
directly regulating sources or first sellers when designing its greenhouse gas policy. It was 
making a virtue of necessity by initially adopting a load-based approach when it began to 
consider cap-and-trade policy. Given the new act’s mandate to cover sources statewide, PUC and 
its sister agencies now have the ability to design a different kind of policy. 
Efficiency Policies 
A related set of questions concerns the ability of PUC to implement its efficiency 
programs. Since the 1970s, California has been a world leader in efficiency programs. PUC has 
decoupled revenue from sales for California’s IOUs in an effort to remove the disincentive for 
IOUs to invest in programs that would reduce their sales. Recently, PUC moved to provide 
stronger positive incentives for IOUs to invest in efficiency by rewarding the achievement of 
certain goals. As with the supply-side policies, the demand-side policies are intended to 
                                                 
7 Senate Bill 1368 expanded this approach and directed the California Public Utilities Commission and the 
California Energy Commission to set a greenhouse gas performance standard to ensure that new long-term financial 
commitments in baseload power plants by electric load-serving entities have greenhouse gas emissions that are as 
low as, or lower than, emissions from a combined-cycle natural gas power plant. In May 2007 PUC adopted 
greenhouse gas standards for procurement.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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encourage low-income assistance as well as lessen the overall environmental impact of 
electricity use.  
Would or should PUC’s demand-side efficiency programs be changed or stopped if there 
is a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program? The answer clearly is no. Nonetheless, proponents 
of a load-based approach have suggested that this approach would do a better job of achieving 
emissions reductions because it would raise awareness in the firm regarding investing in 
efficiency and renewables and lessening reliance on fossil fuels. Since the load-serving entity is 
closer to the end use and typically is charged with administering efficiency programs, the 
argument goes, the greenhouse gas program should be placed at this point in the supply chain.8 
Further, firms are said to respond less well to a price signal than to a direct regulatory obligation, 
and therefore one could expect a more robust investment in efficiency if the point of compliance 
with the cap-and-trade program were placed on the LSE.  
One could build intuition for that argument from the earliest actions by firms to 
implement the SO2 trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, but it would be 
a misreading of what has been learned since. Initially, at dozens of facilities, plant managers and 
engineers who had not previously focused much on SO2 emissions and who knew little about the 
concept of cap-and-trade began to experiment with more thorough fuel washing and expanding 
their use of mid- and low-sulfur coal. Vendors, meanwhile, began to experiment with the sorbent 
injected into desulfurization scrubbers. For the first time, all these parties had an incentive to go 
beyond a simple performance standard.  
The SO2 program got the attention of plant managers and engineers, but within a short time 
compliance responsibility was taken away from them because emissions allowances came to be 
viewed as a financial asset. Compliance with the cap-and-trade program was kicked upstairs and 
folded into fuel purchase decisions. Plant managers and engineers were given an incentive to 
reduce allowance use analogous to their incentive to reduce fuel use. A ton of emissions avoided 
was an allowance earned, as valuable as reducing fuel expense, and there were trade-offs to be 
made along these dimensions. This organizational learning was one of the subtle ways that 
                                                 
8 For example, testifying before the Joint En Banc Hearing of PUC and CEC on Point of Regulation in the 
Electricity Sector in San Francisco on August 21, 2007, Richard Cowart called LSEs “ideally positioned through 
portfolio management and their buy decisions. It sends signals upstream to generators and they also have 
relationships with customers. So, they can work with customers to reduce carbon emissions. So, they have also the 
potential of affecting decisions downstream.” Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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incentives led to innovation, as firms learned to reduce their costs of compliance under the SO2 
program (Burtraw 1996). Today, firms think of the market-based SO2 program as a financial 
problem managed by trading desks. They have moved beyond autarkic behavior with trading 
internal to the company and have become active in the external market, and the management of 
plants is functionally the same as if they faced an emissions tax or a change in upstream fuel 
prices (Ellerman et al. 2000; Swift 2001).  
Siting SO2 compliance activities at one or another level in the firm or market will not lead 
to any further emissions reductions because the industry operates under an emissions cap. With a 
CO2 cap-and-trade program in California, the same result will obtain: it is the cap that will 
determine the level of emissions, not the point of compliance for the regulation. If the regulation 
imposes compliance at a level intended to directly affect corporate culture and organizational 
behavior rather than directly achieving emissions reductions, it could potentially raise costs for 
firms and thereby raise the social cost of the program. But it will not do anything for achieving 
environmental goals because emissions will be capped.9  
Impacts on Customers and Producers 
Will there be different impacts on customers and producers? Where markets determine 
the price of electricity, the incidence of the program (i.e., how the cost burden is shared among 
customers and producers) is determined by the elasticities of supply and demand in that market, 
not where the regulation is applied. The wholesale price of power would be different under these 
two approaches, but the retail price effect is expected to be identical. To the extent the wholesale 
electricity market is competitive and retail prices allow for a pass-through of costs, it makes no 
difference where the point of compliance is located with respect to the effect on consumers. To 
the extent that the wholesale market does not appear transparently competitive, it is foremost the 
result of regulatory intervention meant to protect consumers as well as achieve environmental 
goals. 
Advocates for a load-based approach have pointed to the possibility that under a cap-and-
trade program, producers could gain windfall profits at the expense of consumers. The issue of 
windfall profits has gained attention since evidence has emerged of billions of dollars in 
                                                 
9 Parties have made an indirect argument that changing corporate culture may make it easier to amend the cap in the 
future. However, the converse argument is that raising costs may erode political support for environmental goals. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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unanticipated earnings due to free allocation of emissions allowances in the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (Sijm et al. 2006).  
Under a cap-and-trade program, producers receive compensation two ways. One way is 
the potential allocation of free allowances. The second way is through changes in the wholesale 
power price, where the increase in revenues is determined by the increase in the marginal cost of 
the marginal generator. All sources selling into the market receive the increase in revenue as 
determined at the margin, whether one’s change in cost is greater than or less than that of the 
marginal generator. Typically, the marginal facility is a natural gas plant, whose CO2 emissions, 
though substantial, are still less than half those from the average coal-fired plant. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, at low-emitting or nonemitting facilities where there is little or no change in cost 
associated with the program, the change in revenues is likely to represent an increase in 
profitability even if allowances are purchased in an auction.  
 
Figure 3. Wholesale power price in competitive market as determined by  














Effects in Figure 3 are illustrated for an individual facility; however, an individual facility 
does not really have standing. The shareholders of firms own a portfolio of facilities, and some 
facilities gain value and some lose value. The effect on a firm is an aggregation of effects on 
facilities in the firm’s portfolio. Consequently, some firms win and some lose. The winners tend 
to be firms with relatively low compliance costs because they own a portfolio of relatively low-Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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emitting plants. These firms will realize an increase in revenues associated with the rise in the 
wholesale electricity price that is greater than their own change in compliance costs. Conversely, 
any gain in value for one particular facility does not necessarily map into a gain in value for the 
portfolio of facilities owned by a firm.  
Looking at the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and accounting for the 
portfolio of generation assets owned by companies, Burtraw et al. (2006) find that even under an 
auction, 11 of the 23 largest generation companies in the region would realize an increase in 
market value. If allowances are given away, one can expect a gain in profitability on a broad 
scale. These authors find that under free allocation of emissions allowances to generators, each 
of these companies at least breaks even, and several see substantial increases in value. 
In California a large number of facilities, including nuclear, wind, geothermal, and 
hydroelectric plants, have zero emissions. The regulated IOUs own most of these facilities, and 
the increase in value of these facilities would be returned to ratepayers. Nonetheless, this does 
not allay the concern that free allocation of emissions allowances could lead to windfall profits 
for most if not all generation companies.  
The key idea is that windfall profits are related to free allocation, not the point of 
compliance. Many people advocate a load-based approach to get away from free allocation of 
emissions allowances to generators and implicitly to assign allowance value to customers. This 
reasoning makes the mistake of lumping together point of compliance and point of allocation, 
but as Figure 2 illustrates, it does not have to be that way, and the Market Advisory Committee 
strongly recommended against it. The point of compliance would not affect how the cost of the 
program is distributed. Where emissions are properly accounted for, the effect on the retail 
power price is identical and the effect on the value of generation assets is identical.  
Policymakers have a degree of freedom: they could, for example, distribute allowance 
value among customers and producers to achieve any distributional outcome that is desired.10 A 
load-based approach with an auction would have the same effect on retail prices as the first-seller 
approach with an auction. Alternatively, one could have a load-based approach and freely 
                                                 
10 The Market Advisory Committee suggested that assignment of value is preferable to allocation of allowances. If 
allowance value is assigned in the near term, that assignment could be phased out over time to allow retail price 
adjustments in the future. The allocation of allowances also could be phased out, but the committee reasoned that it 
would lead to a greater sense of entitlement to allowances. Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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allocate allowances to generators, who would then sell them to LSEs, and generators would earn 
substantial profits.11  
In any outcome, one should guard against the parochial assignment of this allowance 
value to the electricity sector—that is, the notion that the allowance value is a pie that can be 
shared among electricity customers and producers. The economic value of allowances is not 
created in the electricity sector; it is created by a societal commitment to place a scarcity value 
on CO2 emissions throughout the economy. The fact that electricity has incumbency as a heavy 
emitter of CO2 emissions does not mean the value of carbon allowances belongs to electricity 
customers or electricity producers. 
Given society’s decision to place a value on the use of CO2, an assignment of the value of 
carbon allowances to electricity customers rather than producers constitutes a windfall to 
electricity consumers if the value is used to subsidize the electricity price. Minimizing the 
politically unpopular effect on price has been an explicit objective of many advocates. The 
practical design of public policy success requires a transition in the changes in relative prices in 
the economy. This will lessen the cost of the program by lessening the economic disruptions 
associated with an abrupt change in policy.  
However, if policymakers remain wedded indefinitely to an electricity price that does not 
reflect the scarcity value of CO2 while other sectors of the economy are treated differently, then 
the marginal cost of emissions reductions will differ across the economy, potentially greatly 
increasing the cost to the economy of emissions reductions. It will also undermine consumer 
decisions with respect to investments in end-use efficiency because electricity will be priced 
below its marginal social cost. This is why the Market Advisory Committee recommended a 
mixed approach of auction and free allocation, with the auction growing over time, and 
allowance value assigned to reinforce program goals and to meet social priorities rather than to 
compensate producers or consumers in the long run.  
                                                 
11 Both approaches preclude grandfathered free allocation to generators because of the difficulty of assigning 
allocation to importers. However, another type of free allocation, known as updating (in Europe this is described as 
benchmarking), can be used. Updating allocation is done on the basis of production and the current or very recent 
period. Because there is essentially an output subsidy in the form of free allowances based on output, updating 
provides an incentive for electricity generation. Compared with grandfathering, an updating approach tends to lessen 
the likelihood of windfall profits because of its effect on the product price (Burtraw et al. 2005).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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Where There Are Real Differences 
A second group of issues involves real differences in how load-based and first-seller 
programs would perform. One issue is administrative in nature, a second concerns monitoring 
and incentives, and a third is environmental integrity. 
Administration  
The virtue of a cap-and-trade program, according to economists, is that it is simple in 
both theory and practice. The traditional prescriptive regulatory approach (a.k.a. command-and-
control) seems simple until one accounts for the endless and idiosyncratic variances that have to 
be reviewed for virtually every facility. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has found it 
dramatically simpler to administer cap-and-trade—nationwide, for example, only about 100 
government staffers implement the SO2 and NOx trading programs (EPA 2003)—and this 
contributes to transparency and the perception of fairness associated with cap-and-trade. One of 
the pleasant surprises of the SO2 trading program was the paucity of litigation, compared with 
what is expected when traditional rate-based or technology-based standards are implemented 
(Burtraw and Swift 1996). 
Simplicity in theory and practice would not describe the load-based approach, however. 
With respect to the treatment of imported power, the load-based and first-seller approaches share 
complicated accounting and administration. But for in-state generation, the first-seller approach 
easily identifies and accounts for emissions, whereas the load-based approach introduces 
complexity and imprecision in making an assignment of emissions to generation that occurs in 
the state as well as out of state. To account for emissions associated with electricity 
consumption, computer software will have to link emissions to load in a manner that will lack 
transparency and be difficult for third parties or even market participants to verify. In California 
the Independent System Operator (ISO), which oversees most, but not all, of the state’s grid, 
manages roughly 15,000 transactions hourly. To track these transactions and their associated 
emissions is a tremendous project even under the best of circumstances. 
Monitoring and Incentives 
However, the emissions trading program is not being introduced under the best of 
circumstances, and consequently the load-based approach will not be able to assign emissions to 
load in a precise manner. One source of imprecision comes from ancillary operations providing 
load balancing, voltage support, and spinning and nonspinning reserve services to the electricity 
market, which account for five percent   to seven percent of the energy procurement in the state. 
These services are typically applied by auction by most ISOs, and the bidding structure has no Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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information about the emissions profile. In the context of the grid, ancillary services are a public 
good and their benefits cannot be uniquely assigned to one or another LSE. Therefore, emissions 
associated with ancillary services are assigned to LSEs arbitrarily. It follows that the LSEs would 
lack the ability to influence emissions associated with ancillary services in this portion of the 
market. In contrast, emissions associated with ancillary services would be naturally assimilated 
in a first-seller approach.  
Under a load-based approach, imprecision of measurement in the ancillary market and 
the general structure of the wholesale market will erode the incentive for most generators to 
reduce emissions on an even broader scale. In a competitive wholesale market, the marginal 
generator sets the price. Imagine the market-clearing price is set by generator i and the price per 
megawatt-hour of electricity (p) is equal to the marginal cost (gi) of generator i. All other 
facilities (j) with marginal cost (gj) less than gi earn p as well. These facilities have an inherent 
incentive to reduce their generation cost because their profit is equal to the difference between 
revenue and cost; that is, p – gj. Under a first-seller approach, they would also have an incentive 
to reduce their emissions because this would reduce their requirement to surrender emissions 
allowances and thereby lower their cost, just like reducing generation cost. 
The incentives under a load-based approach are quite different. The introduction of a 
load-based program would raise the cost for the LSE if generator i emits CO2 because in addition 
to paying a wholesale market price, the LSE would have an allowance cost (ai). If this facility 
remained the marginal generator, the effective cost of power for the LSE from this facility would 
rise to p
+= gi + ai. If the LSE had the ability to send signals into the market to discriminate 
among bids according to their emissions, then the market would identify a new marginal 
generator k instead of i if gk + ak < gi + ai, resulting in a new wholesale power price  ' k p g = . 
Facilities i and k would have incentives to reduce their emissions, but all other facilities j with  
gj + aj < gk + ak would not have an incentive to try to reduce their emissions rate because (a) they 
would not have compliance responsibility under a load-based approach and (b) reducing their 
emissions would not change their revenue but presumably would raise their cost. Consequently, 
inframarginal generators would lack an incentive to achieve emissions reductions. 
The differences between the two approaches come into even starker contrast in the 
context of the ISO’s Market Reform and Technology Upgrade initiative, already approved by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. One component of this will be the expected 
introduction of a day-ahead market in 2008 that will attract 10 to 20 percent of the power 
provided into the market. The reform moves away from unit-specific contracts and commitments 
and allows more sophisticated portfolio strategies in the power market. As such, the day-ahead Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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market will erode the “line of sight” between generators and the LSEs because sources that 
supply into the market will not be identifiable by the entities purchasing from the market. The 
LSE would submit a schedule of bids for purchase and the ISO would clear the market among 
offers to sell. This is a fundamental component of the market that leads to efficiency 
improvements in the ISO’s scheduling of the transmission grid. 
The consequence is the classic problem of the bad chasing out the good in the day-ahead 
market. The combination of a load-based cap-and-trade program and the day-ahead market 
would lead relatively dirty generators to bid into the market to hide the cost of their emissions. 
Generators in the day-ahead market would lack incentive to reduce emissions because they are 
not identified and receive no reward for doing so. The only solution would be to separate the ISO 
day-ahead market into a bunch of different markets, each with different emissions profiles, but 
this would undermine the advantages of the day-ahead market. 
When LSEs buy from the day-ahead market, as opposed to making purchases outside the 
market, they would buy with a specific anticipated emissions rate. The actual estimation of 
emissions associated with generation would have to occur ex-post because the actual generation 
that is scheduled would depend on congestion on the transmission grid and the decisions of the 
system operator. What happens if sometime later the LSE finds out that a different constituency 
of generators was actually dispatched by the system operator and the emissions rates deviate 
from the rates the LSE thought it bought from the market? Litigation may have to determine 
whether the ISO or the LSE is responsible, and the administrative and legal issues are likely to 
become complex. 
Meanwhile, relatively clean generators would want to avoid the day-ahead market. One 
would expect to see greater bilateral contracts and self-scheduling among relatively clean 
generators trying to capture the value of their relatively low emissions rate. The LSE would then 
submit instructions to the ISO for specific dispatch of facilities under a bilateral contract. This 
begets another issue. What happens, and which party is liable, when the LSE instructions to the 
ISO for self-scheduling cannot be fulfilled because of transmission constraints? Is the ISO or the 
LSE responsible for the unanticipated emissions? 
Gillenwater and Breidenich (2007) describe an approach to load-based regulation that 
would help overcome the problem of imprecise monitoring and impure incentives, at least for 
power generated in the state, but unfortunately this approach would move the cap-and-trade 
program away from efficiency in other ways. The authors propose a program that would not 
require bilateral transactions between generators and LSEs. Generators would produce a tradable Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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certificate for the power they sell onto the grid that would record two measures: the power put 
onto the grid (MWh) and the emissions (tons CO2). LSEs would be responsible for acquiring a 
sufficient number of certificates to cover their sales to customers, and they would be responsible 
for the emissions that accompany the power sales on their portfolio of certificates. The 
certificates that an LSE acquires would not necessarily come from generators that provide power 
to the LSE; they could come from any generator in the program. The LSE would have to pay a 
premium for certificates with relatively a low emissions profile and would manage a portfolio of 
certificates such that its emissions cap was achieved. 
The certificate approach is elegant in the way that it provides incentives to generators and 
the LSE. Unfortunately, this approach creates a bad model if the electricity sector is integrated 
into an economywide trading program. The way that power producers earn certificates is through 
power production, and therefore this is fundamentally an output-based, updating allocation of 
certificates (Hobbs 2007). Such a program provides an output subsidy to generators that are 
cleaner than the system average, which leads to expanded production from those facilities and 
which leads to lower electricity prices. To see this in a simple way, first imagine a program with 
full auction of allowances (a) at a price  a p , which in general moves positively with the amount 
of emissions and generation. A facility must buy allowances to cover emissions (e), and its 
emissions change with production at a marginal rate of  ( ) eq ′ . The marginal generation cost is an 
increasing function of quantity () () 0 cq ′ > . The marginal facility will generate where its total 
variable cost is equal to revenue:  () ( ) ( ) a pq cq eq p ′′ = +∗ , and the allocation of emissions and 
generation can be expected to be efficient. Now imagine instead emission allowances were 
distributed for free using a certificate program. Let the average emission rate under the cap 
(termed the “default emission rate” by Gillenwater and Breidenich) be e, such that if all 
generators produced this amount the cap would be met. Firms are freely allocated certificates at 
this emission rate times their quantity of output. At the prior level of production by all firms the 
price of allowances (certificates) would be unchanged. However, the price of electricity would 
be greater than variable cost:  () () () ( ) a p qc q e qep ′′ >+ − ∗ , because of the new term on the 
right hand side  a ep ∗  that constitutes a subsidy to production. Consequently, the facility would 
chose to produce at a level of output equal to  ˆ qq > . 
Although there is a political virtue to lower electricity prices that would result from an 
output-based, updating allocation, as noted elsewhere there is a substantial efficiency cost 
(Burtraw et al. 2001; Fischer 2003). The output subsidy leads to increased generation, with a 
larger number of MWh chasing the same number of allowances under the cap, which drives up Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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the allowance price. This has two negative consequences. The higher allowance price sends an 
inaccurate signal to policymakers about the minimum resource costs necessary to achieve 
emissions reductions. In addition, the effect would be to raise allowance prices for the 
economywide program while subsidizing production of electricity. 
Some advocates of the load-based approach have argued that the imprecise monitoring 
and impure incentives problems do not matter because there is little opportunity for supply-side 
reductions in emissions. A similar viewpoint was prominent prior to the implementation of the 
SO2 trading program as well. At that time, most observers expected that SO2 emissions 
reductions would come primarily from the introduction of capital-intensive post-combustion 
controls (scrubbers). Some switching from high to low sulfur coal was expected. Blending of 
types coal types was expected to be limited to at most five percent low-sulfur coal in boilers that 
operated with high-sulfur fuel (Torrens et al. 1992). However, given the incentive to do so, many 
facilities found ways to reduce emissions without scrubbers. Ellerman et al. (2000) estimate that 
63 percent of emissions reductions in the first three years of the program (1995–1997) were 
achieved in ways other than scrubbing; this is a careful estimate that accounts for unanticipated 
changes in relative fuel prices that favored switching to lower-sulfur coal even in the absence of 
the emissions cap. The primary method to achieve reductions was switching to lower-sulfur coal. 
In addition, trial and error led to the discovery that fuel blends containing up to 30 to 40 percent 
low-sulfur coal were possible without causing a derating of the facility (Burtraw 2000). 
Today, many people look to post-combustion controls for CO2 (carbon capture and 
geologic sequestration) as the prominent way to achieve large emissions reductions from the 
electricity sector, but unfortunately, the widespread commercial application of this technology is 
a ways off. But other types of measures to reduce CO2 emissions, such as cofiring biomass at 
coal-fired power plants, are feasible now. Improvements in heat rate (the fuel requirement per 
unit of electricity generation) and associated reductions in fuel use have been achieved on a slow 
but ongoing basis for decades and offer continued opportunity. Moreover, fluctuation in heat 
rates and emissions varies significantly among facilities and depends on how a facility is 
dispatched, and thus the scheduling of facilities for operation provides another opportunity to 
harvest low-hanging fruit on a fleet-wide basis. However, under a load-based approach, the 
incentive to harvest these opportunities to reduce emissions would be eroded because there 
would be no way to pass the value of emissions reductions to many generators. More 
importantly, the load-based approach will fail to deliver incentives for technological innovation 
(Van Horn and Remedios 2007). Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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In sum, the load-based approach will not be able to send accurate, transparent signals to 
generators in a general way about the opportunity cost of emissions. This is especially true if the 
electricity market continues with market reform. The lesson is that it is important to recognize 
that the vision for the future of the electricity market and the design of a greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade program are inherently linked.  
Environmental Integrity  
The third difference between the two approaches regards environmental integrity. If there 
is a CO2 emissions cap and it is enforced, then one can presume that emissions will fall. 
However, the two approaches have broad-reaching—and different—implications for the integrity 
of the institutions that they would create. 
If one is going to use a market to address environmental problems, achieving 
environmental integrity requires integrity in the emissions market: any emissions covered by the 
cap-and-trade program must be monitored, reported, and verified with a high degree of accuracy. 
Although both approaches have inherent inaccuracies with respect to imported power, a load-
based approach has inaccuracies for all emissions in the market. This threatens to undermine 
public confidence in the institution of cap-and-trade for greenhouse gas policy in California.  
Looking back 15 years, one can note what happened with the SO2 trading program. At 
the time, emissions trading was far from popular among environmental advocates. There were 
cartoons asking, “What’s next, the L.A. Police Department trying to buy civil rights credits in 
Wisconsin?”  
Yet a few years later, environmental advocates in Washington were the leading 
proponents for using cap-and-trade to address a new wave of environmental problems. The SO2 
program brought virtually 100 percent compliance. Interested parties could look at the web and 
see electronic reporting of emissions and tracking of allowance ownership. Environmental 
advocates could see exactly what was happening at specific plants and knew that every plant was 
incurring an opportunity cost associated with those emissions. That reassured the financial 
community. Investors knew that if they made an investment to reduce emissions at a specific 
plant, the value of that investment would not be hidden by averaging of emissions in the market 
and thereby eroded. 
The key element in a market-based policy is to use changes in relative prices to pass to 
economic decisionmakers, both upstream and downstream, financial responsibility for the 
environmental consequences of the economic decisions they make. A load-based approached can Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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be criticized in this regard for its lack of transparency and its inability to send those price signals 
upstream, which has the potential to undermine investor confidence and erode confidence in the 
emissions market.  
The integrity of the emissions market is important, but not because the success of the 
program should be measured on the basis of the performance of a market. The point of emissions 
allowance trading is not to trade emissions allowances. The design of the market is important 
because it can lower the overall cost of achieving emissions reductions. This in turn can lead to 
savings for households and for business, or it can mean that society can achieve greater 
emissions reductions for the same cost. However, if California is to use a market to achieve its 
goals, then it should not want to create a market that is not going to perform as markets are 
expected to. That would erode confidence in the market and also in the political will to achieve 
environmental goals. 
Where the Jury Is Still Out 
In two general areas—the law and national-level environmental policy—it is difficult to 
tell whether there is an important difference between a load-based approach and a first-seller 
approach. 
Legal Challenges 
The legality of the approaches being considered is one issue that could trump other 
considerations if one or the other of the approaches was found to violate the law. Two potential 
legal challenges have been discussed widely. One is the Interstate Commerce Clause, which 
constrains the state’s ability to regulate interstate trade. Specifically, the state cannot treat 
commerce from inside and outside the state in a different manner to the disadvantage of out-of-
state entities.  
One way to view the first-seller approach is that it would operate like the proposed low-
carbon fuel standard (Farrell and Sperling 2007). All first sellers of electricity would be 
regulated according to an assumed emissions rate, and sellers would have the opportunity to 
introduce evidence to the contrary. In fact, for sellers of power generated in California it would 
be easy to introduce evidence—by reference to the monitoring of emissions from large stationary 
sources that will be compiled by the California Air Resources Board. For power from out of 
state, first sellers would have the ability to provide financial information linking power identified 
on the NERC e-Tag documents with specific generation sources. They could then show the path 
of financial obligations that is associated with power generation. Conceptually, this is a uniform Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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application of the regulation for sources in state and out of state; whether the law views it in this 
manner remains to be seen. The load-based and first-seller approaches appear to be in the same 
boat with respect to how Interstate Commerce Clause issues are interpreted. 
The second potential legal challenge has to do with the Federal Power Act, which 
reserves to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the authority to set rules governing 
transmission of electricity. Some have suggested that the act may render substantive “first seller” 
obligations unenforceable because it places the state in the position of regulating wholesale 
power transactions. Others disagree. Either way, some have suggested the state could seek a 
declaratory order that would explicitly delegate authority to the state or the ISO to regulate 
transactions in these ways. On this legal issue the uncertainty is greater for the first-seller 
approach. The load-based approach imposes obligations directly on the load-serving entities and 
indirectly on wholesale transactions, so it may have greater immunity against a Federal Power 
Act challenge.  
Influencing the Federal Policy Agenda 
The Market Advisory Committee articulated the view that the cap-and-trade program was 
not inconsistent with the state’s existing widespread technology and regulatory policies 
promoting efficiency in electricity end use and low-emitting sources of generation. With these 
policies already in place, the cap-and-trade program is intended to leave no low-cost emissions 
reductions behind by providing incentives for all generators in state and out of state to squeeze 
out the small margins of additional efficiency through heat rate improvements, biomass cofiring, 
small changes in the dispatch order, or whatever means they may discover. 
One function of a cap-and-trade program in California is to add to the momentum for 
achieving climate policy at the federal level and to propose an architecture that will influence 
federal policymakers. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative states have clearly done this 
already with their decision about the initial distribution of emissions allowances with an auction.  
What might be the implication of a load-based cap-and-trade program in California? This 
approach was initially suggested as a matter of necessity, not as a useful model on a national 
level. If the market were to work poorly, it might impart unfortunate lessons for national 
policymakers. On the other hand, a powerful impetus for federal action throughout history has 
been to rationalize the helter-skelter of policies that spring up among the states.  
A first-seller approach in California would have the advantage that as California joins 
with regional efforts as part of the Western Climate Initiative, the approach would segue Resources for the Future  Burtraw 
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naturally into a source-based approach on a regional basis. This option would allow California to 
transition naturally to a regional or national generator-based system. 
Conclusion 
The load-based approach and first-seller approach are two alternative designs for a cap-
and-trade program in the electricity sector. They differ in their ability to account for emissions in 
the state, and this paper argues that a first-seller approach would be a stronger framework. This 
recommendation takes into account the fact that the California PUC has played a leadership role 
in portfolio planning, procurement, and efficiency policies. The role for cap-and-trade is simply 
to leave no low-cost emissions reductions behind. A first-seller approach is much better suited to 
this purpose. 
Three points conclude this argument. First, the organization and vision for the greenhouse 
gas market and the electricity market are inherently linked. The load-based approach is not 
consistent with market reform and greater competition in the electricity sector.  
Second, the load-based approach may prevail as a way to administer a cap with some 
flexibility, but it is not a market. It is increasingly flexible, increasingly smart regulation—one 
can think of it as cap-and-regulate. The reason to adopt a cap-and-trade program has to do with 
the virtues associated with the market, including administrative simplicity, environmental 
certainty, and cost reductions. If California is going to use a market-based approach, it should not 
design a market by compromise. It is important for good market design to keep it simple and 
transparent. A poorly designed market can lead to poor incentives and poor accountability that 
can bridge to other sectors and undermine confidence in climate policy. This raises the question 
whether it is worth the trouble and risk of embracing the idea as though it were a market. 
Finally, from a statewide and national perspective, it is important to resist the parochial 
view that allowance value should be kept in the electricity sector. Keeping it in the electricity 
sector and subsidizing electricity consumption will cause marginal costs to differ across the 
economy, raise total costs across the economy, and undermine the environmental initiative. In 
designing its program, California has an opportunity to take a broader, longer-term view and set 
a progressive example that one can hope would influence national policy.  
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